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Abstract
This paper uses the data of 227 North Korean refugees who have
settled in South Korea to investigate the relationship between
working in the informal economy (market component of the
economy) and bribe-giving, and between bribe-giving and the
number of hours worked in the formal sector (planned compo-
nent of the economy). The first relationship is positive, and the
second relationship is negative. These results imply that wide-
spread informal economy activities in North Korea have been un-
dermining the socialist regime through bribery.
1. Introduction
North Korea remains one of the most destitute and iso-
lated countries in the world. Despite the well-known fact
that the North Korean economy largely failed to feed its
population, North Korea has surprisingly managed to
avoid collapse so far. Not much is known about North Ko-
rea’s economy because its government discontinued pub-
lishing annual statistical books from the early 1960s and
has been actively preventing others from obtaining reli-
able information about its economic conditions. However,
the increasing number of North Korean refugees can be in-
formation sources to understanding the current economic
condition of North Korea (Park 2002; Yang 2005; Lee 2007;
Kim and Song 2008; Haggard and Noland 2010).
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A common feature found in these studies is that informal economy (i.e., market) ac-
tivities in North Korea account for the large part of household economic activities.
For example, Kim and Song (2008) report that 78 percent of the total survey respon-
dents were working in informal sectors, and the informal economy generated about
78 percent of the total income of North Korean households. This implies that infor-
mal economic activities (IEAs) have become major means to afford the necessary
consumer goods.
These widespread IEAs might have some implications for the formal socialist econ-
omy (i.e., the planned economy). Some papers have argued that the informal econ-
omy acts to grease the wheel (Leff 1964; Rock and Bonnett 2004). In the context of
socialist economies, Grossman (1977) found that the “second” economy, which
would be equivalent to the informal economy in market economies, had been grow-
ing rapidly in the Soviet Union and contributed to the supply of consumer goods to
a substantial extent. Wellisz and Findlay (1986) suggested that the welfare of con-
sumers increased due to the shifting of resources from heavy industry to the indus-
try of consumer goods in the second economy.
Several authors who have written about the second economy have hypothesized
that the collapse of the Soviet Union was due to the “informalization” of the econ-
omy (Treml and Alexeev 1994; Grossman 1998; Solnick 1998; Wintrobe 1998). The
large informal economy distorted the input allocation of the centrally planned econ-
omy and, hence, decreased the productivity in the economy. Furthermore, corrup-
tion associated with the second economy undermined the legitimacy of the socialist
regime. According to Treml and Alexeev (1994), the effect of the Soviet informal
economy on the economy as a whole became negative from the 1980s because
the possible lubricating effects of the second economy were dominated by its nega-
tive effects.
The effects of IEAs on the North Korean economy are only beginning to be explored
thoroughly. Kim and Song (2008) examine the impacts of IEA on labor supply in the
formal economy, and found that IEAs, particularly secondary jobs such as trading in
markets, decrease working hours in the formal economy. Haggard and Noland
(2010) argue that the failure of institutions such as the state caused growing market
activities. Lastly, Kim (2010) investigates the impacts of bribery prevalent in North
Korea on the political system and discusses its possible implications for the stability
of the regime.
This paper tests and ªnds support for the hypotheses advanced in Kim (2010)
that IEA promotes bribery, and that bribery undermines the formal economy by
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reducing the amount of work effort in the formal economy. The data for the tests
are collected from mostly recently arrived North Korean refugees, this is described
in Section 2. Section 3 analyzes the relationship between IEA and bribery; and Sec-
tion 4 summarizes our analysis.
2. The informal economy and bribery:Data description
2.1 Characteristics of respondents
In this study the survey data were collected from 227 North Korean refugees. The
survey was conducted in small groups using face-to-face interviews. A total of 112
questions were asked to cover a variety of information on economic activities in
both the formal sector and the informal sector in North Korea. More speciªcally, the
survey included questions on occupations, income, expenditure, and labor supply
for the period of one year before the refugees’ departure from North Korea. To col-
lect and analyze the most updated information on the North Korean economy, we
targeted our survey to refugees who escaped from North Korea recently. Further-
more, we surveyed them in special facilities in South Korea that provide a two-
month-long adjustment program for North Korean refugees.1 The surveys took
place four times during the period of April–July 2009.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of our data set. In this survey, 92.4 percent of
the total respondents ºed from North Korea between the years 2007 and 2009.
Therefore, these data have a great advantage in capturing the most recent features of
North Korea’s economy. Our data set is, however, unlikely to be representative of
the North Korean population. About 60 percent of the refugees resided in
Hamkyung Province, which borders China. The share of respondents who lived in
border regions with China increases to 87 percent when the respondents who re-
sided in Yanggang Province are taken into account.2 The share of refugees who be-
longed to the Labor Party of North Korea is 18.3 percent. Because we know that the
number of Labor Party members in North Korea is about 3 million and that the
North Korean population aged 15 and above is 17 million, the share of refugees who
106 Asian Economic Papers
The Informal Economy and Bribery in North Korea
1 When North Korean refugees arrive in South Korea, they stay in these facilities (divided ac-
cording to gender) for two months followed by interviews conducted by South Korean gov-
ernment ofªcials for a certain period. Afterwards, they are assigned to places where they
live and are treated equally as South Koreans according to the South Korean constitution.
2 This problem is common in other surveys of North Korean refugees, and has to be taken
into account in analyzing their characteristics and interpreting results. One way to mitigate
this problem is to use regression techniques and to capture these regional characteristics us-
ing proper variables. In addition, one may weight samples in accordance with the share of
regional population in total population. We use a variable of weighting the share of regional
population in total population in regressions.
had membership in the Labor Party is broadly in line with the share of Labor Party
members in the North Korean population.
2.2 Participation in the informal economy
Table 2 presents the share of the number of respondents participating in the formal
and in the informal economy. The share of respondents having participated in the
informal economy exceeds that of those working in the formal economy: Two-thirds
of respondents participated in the informal economy whereas only about one-half
took part in the formal economy. In addition, 32.4 percent of respondents replied
that they worked both in the formal and in the informal economy.
IEA is dominant not only in terms of the participation rate but also in terms of the
share of income made in the informal economy in total income. The mean of annual
household income from the formal economy among those who work there is 125,924
North Korean won and that from the informal economy is 2,739,584 won.3 These are
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3 Amain reason for working in the formal economy in spite of very low formal wages is that
it is compulsory. It is subject to penalty if one does not work in a regular job without good
reasons such as illness or being a housewife. In addition, working in the formal sector
provides an entitlement to receive food rationing. However, food rationing (the Public
Table 1. Characteristics of respondents
Characteristics
Persons (unless otherwise speciªed) Share (%)
Demographic characteristics
Men
Women
88
139
38.8
61.2
Age (average) 35.1 years
Number of family members (average) 3.36
Regions
Pyungyang 1 0.5
Pyungahn Province 12 5.4
Hamkyung Province 137 60.2
Hwanghae Province 9 4.1
Kangwon Province 7 3.2
Jagang Province 0 0.0
Yanggang Province 61 26.6
Departure year
1997–2000 7 3.1
2001–03 3 1.3
2004–06 7 3.1
2007–09 210 92.4
Education
No education 2 0.9
Up to middle school 8 3.6
Up to high school 165 72.8
Up to university 52 22.7
Party membership
Party member 42 18.3
Non–party member 185 81.7
Sample size 227 100
Source: Statistics based on author’s (B-Y Kim) interviews with 227 North Korean refugees.
approximately US$ 42 and 913, respectively, if we apply the black market exchange
rate between U.S. dollars and North Korean won prevailing in October 2009.4
The survey asked about the details of IEA: private-plot activities, stockbreeding, and
other activities such as trade on markets and production of manufactured goods.
The share of respondents who replied that they engaged in private-plot activities
and stockbreeding is 33.1 percent and 22.7 percent of the total respondents, respec-
tively, when multiple responses are allowed.5 The most popular informal activities
are, however, other activities involving market-related activities: 83.4 percent of
those who participated in the informal economy responded that they had informal
jobs such as selling manufactured goods on markets, street vending of food, and
smuggling. Manufactured goods sold on markets are clothes, shoes, or bicycles,
most of which originated from China. However, there were also several cases where
refugees sold what they produced. These items included mirrors, nets, furniture,
clothes, and artwork. People also sold eggs, corn, rice, ice cream, rice cakes, alco-
holic beverages, and candies, which they produced and manufactured on their own.
2.3. The informal economy and bribery
As one survey participant told us, “Nothing can be achieved without bribery in
North Korea”—bribery is a widespread practice in North Korea. About half of the
respondents (112 out of 227) replied that they had given bribes, and the share of ex-
penditure on bribes in total expenditure is 15.3 percent. Figure 1 shows the respon-
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Distribution System) nearly collapsed in mid 1990s and is now available only for some re-
gions and for some groups of people.
4 The North Korean authorities implemented currency reform in December 2009, which con-
verted the old currency of 100 won with new currency of 1 won and a ceiling applied on the
amount of old currency that was exchangeable with new currency.
5 Those who dedicated themselves to private plot–related activities had an average of 0.7857
acre of land and mostly grew corn or beans. Stockbreeding was conducted in a small scale
with an average number of stock being 11—including pigs, chickens, dogs, and rabbits.
Table 2. Participation in the formal economy and in the informal economy
Participation in the formal economy
No Yes Total Share
Participation in the
informal economy
No 31 40 71 31.6%
Yes 81 73 154 68.4%
Total 112 113 225 100%
Share 49.3% 50.2% 100%
Source: Statistics based on author’s (B-Y Kim) interviews with 225 North Korean refugees.
Note: Two people who had jobs in the formal sector did not answer whether or not they participated in the informal economy as well.
Thus, the number of total samples differs by 2 from total number of refugees in Table 1.
dents’ perception of the spread of bribery in North Korea. Not surprisingly, almost
90 percent of all respondents agreed on bribery being a common practice, whereas
only 1.9 percent disagreed. Moreover, 62.56 percent of the respondents answered
that the people who mostly give bribes are those who sell goods in the informal
economy. Others replied that workers in factories or farms, and those who are in-
volved in foreign trades, also frequently give bribes.
The 116 respondents who worked as vendors in the informal economy were asked
how frequently bribes were given. Figure 2 shows that 25 percent and 37.93 percent
of this group of respondents gave bribes regularly and irregularly, respectively.
About 10 percent of the respondents replied that they gave bribes once. As
almost three-fourths of the vendors had the experience of giving bribes, bribery is
widespread—at least in the vendor segment of the informal economy.
Respondents were also asked how many informal markets there were in their vil-
lages, towns, or cities, and to what extent these markets were controlled by the au-
thorities. More than 90 percent of the respondents replied that at least one informal
market existed in their village, town, or city. However, authorities exercised a
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Figure 1. Perception on the spread of bribery (vendors only)
Source: Statistics based on author’s (B-Y Kim) interviews with 227 North Korean refugees.
Note: The question asked to the refugees was: “To what extent do you believe bribery was prevalent in North Korea when you escaped?”
The interviewees were asked to choose from the following: (1) not prevalent at all; (2) not prevalent; (3) prevalent; (4) very prevalent; (5) do
not know.
considerable degree of control over these markets. Only 13 percent replied that the
level of control was low and 30 percent replied that markets were tightly controlled
by the authorities. Fifty-ªve (55) percent of respondents said that the level of control
varied greatly from time to time. Some replied that the authorities banned IEAs dur-
ing the spring and fall farming seasons, allowed markets to stay open only between
3:00 P.M. and 5:00 P.M., controlled prices of goods, and conªscated foreign products
(especially those from South Korea).
3.Determinants of bribery and its effect on the formal economy
3.1 The informal economy and bribery
This section tests whether the informal economy signiªcantly increases the probabil-
ity of giving bribes. The positive association between the informal economy and
bribery implies an alliance between bribe-givers and bribe-takers, which strengthens
the informal economy. The interests of bribe-taking ofªcials are at odds with the
principles of the socialist system because they want to maintain the sources of their
extra income, namely, the informal sector, in spite of the possibility that it damages
the formal sector of the economy, and weakens state control over the economy.
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Figure 2. Experience of having given bribes (vendors only)
Source: Statistics based on author’s (B-Y Kim) interviews with 227 North Korean refugees.
Note: The question asked to refugees was: “Did you give bribes when you worked as vendor?” The interviewees were asked to choose from
the following: (1) regularly; (2) irregularly; (3) once; (4) never.
In contrast, bribery committed within the formal sector in the socialist system is ei-
ther harmless or good for the stability of a socialist regime. For example, when the
manager of a socialist enterprise gives a bribe to input suppliers to purchase much-
needed inputs in order to fulªll the planned output target, inputs ºow from the in-
formal to the formal sector. Another example is that bureaucrats have an incentive
to speed up bureaucratic procedures if they receive bribes. In short, bribery within
the formal sector (the planned sector), unlike bribery in the informal sector (the mar-
ket sector), increases output and supports the stability of the socialist regime.
Table 3 presents four models to test the determinants.6 For columns (1)–(3), we
coded bribery as a binary choice in which the experience of giving bribes at least
once during one year before the respondents left North Korea is coded as one and
no experience as zero. In column (1), we estimate the binary choice model without
using a weight variable to correct for a regionally unrepresentative sample. We use
the weight variable in column (2) to compare the results in column (1). We classify
participation in the formal and informal economy in more detail in column (3). The
labor market status is coded as follows: working only in the formal economy; work-
ing only in the informal economy, working in both economies; and not working in
either economy. In column (4), we calculated the share of spending on bribes in total
expenditure and used it as a dependent variable. We estimated model 4 using the
tobit model.7
The estimations of the binary choice of giving a bribe (columns (1)–(3) of Table 3)
show that women and more educated people are more likely to pay bribes.8 The
people who regard their existing welfare level to be low, middle, and high are more
likely to give bribes than those who either have very low welfare level or very high
level.9 This may be due to the possibility that those who perceive themselves as
very poor in North Korea did not possess sufªcient resources to bribe ofªcials. In
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6 We converted nominal income to real income by deºating the former using the price index
of rice and corn. The annual price index and the prices of rice and corn are presented in the
Appendix.
7 The use of the tobit model can be justiªed by the fact that there are a number of samples for
which the share of bribe is zero. The tobit model can be applied in this case although there is
no cut off in the lower limit.
8 There are some differences in the sign of coefªcients on education and gender between col-
umn (1) and columns (2)–(3), that is, between the estimation without correcting for regional
weights and those that are corrected for them.
9 These results may be affected by endogeneity. That is, participation in the informal economy
may affect bribery and income level simultaneously. To mitigate this problem, we estimated
the regressions without subjective evaluation of welfare level but obtained results similar to
those reported in Table 3.
contrast, those who enjoyed a very high welfare level in North Korea were likely to
have connections to powerful institutions or individuals and thus felt protected
from the extraction of bribes. Bribe-givers ªnd that national security agents and po-
lice ofªcers are more receptive bribe-takers than managers of ªrms and high gov-
ernment ofªcials. For national security agents and police ofªcers, the odds of bribe-
giving is higher by 17.5 percent and 11.2 percent, respectively. It is noteworthy that
party membership does not reduce bribe-giving.
The most important result is the coefªcient suggesting a positive relationship of
bribe-giving and working in the informal economy. In all speciªcations, working in
the informal economy is positively associated with the experience of bribe-giving.
On the basis of the results in column (2), it is found that the probability of bribe-
giving rises by 60.2 percent if one participates in IEA. When we further classify
working status into four categories as shown in column (3), working both in the for-
mal economy and the informal one increases the probability of bribe-giving by
44.5 percent. In addition, one unit change in working only in the informal economy
causes an increase in bribe-giving by 38.7 percent.
In column (4), we use the share of bribe expenditure in total expenditure as the de-
pendent variable instead of the dummy variable of bribe-giving. One can argue that
this speciªcation is less likely to be affected by endogeneity of the dependent vari-
able compared to those in columns (1)–(3): The binary choice of bribe-giving can af-
fect the decision to participate in the informal economy signiªcantly whereas the
share of expenditure on bribes is unlikely to be inºuenced by such a decision.10 The
result still suggests that working in the informal economy increases bribery but
working in the formal economy decreases it. In sum, all the results presented in
Table 3 imply that bribe-giving is rooted in IEA.
3.2 The effect of bribery on working hours in the formal economy
Bribery widespread in the informal economy can undermine the formal economy.
For instance, the formal economy will be negatively affected if bribery reduces labor
supply to the formal economy—particularly, working hours in ofªcial jobs. We take
the following approach to test this possibility. First, we look at whether bribery sig-
niªcantly reduces weekly working hours in ofªcial jobs. The survey asked actual
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10 To further check the effect of a possible endogeneity bias on our results, we used an instru-
mental variable approach where participation in the informal economy was instrumented
using the variable of gender. This instrument utilized the fact that, in North Korea, women
participate in the informal economy more actively than men (Yang 2005; Kim and Song
2008). We ªnd that the instrumented variable is still signiªcant with correct sign: the
coefªcient and the t-value are 3.20 and 3.41, respectively.
weekly working on the basis of the following ªve choices: (1) more than 60 hours;
(2) 50–59 hours; (3) 40–49 hours; (4) 30–39 hours; and (5) less than 30 hours. Given
that working hours are recorded as a category, we use an ordered logit model to es-
timate the relationship between working hours and bribery. Second, we calculate
the difference between working hours stipulated as a principle and actual working
hours, and use actual working hours subtracted from the stipulated ones as a de-
pendent variable. The results based on these regressions are presented in Table 4.
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Table 3. Determinants of bribe-giving
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable
Binary choice of bribe-giving
(yes1; no1)
Share of bribe
in expenditure
Demographic Gender (male1; female0) 0.338 (0.48) 0.471 (1.82)* 0.470 (1.76)* 0.039 (0.73)
characteristics Age 0.001 (0.03) 0.038 (0.58) 0.011 (0.18) 0.012 (0.97)
Age squared (log) 1.770 (21.7)*** 0.872 (0.66) 1.409 (1.10) 0.065 (0.26)
Number of family members 0.090 (1.09) 0.082 (0.48) 0.083 (0.53) 0.004 (0.17)
Education Primary school Reference category
Secondary school 3.275 (7.55)*** 2.017 (6.64)*** 2.126 (7.44)*** 0.007 (0.12)
University/college 0.875 (1.11) 4.188 (5.14)*** 4.318 (5.15)*** 0.150 (1.51)
Departure year 1.632 (4.11)*** 1.285 (7.46)*** 1.432 (6.05)*** 0.156 (2.26)**
Bribe-giver’s subjective
evaluation of welfare
level in North Korea
Very low Reference category
Low 2.405 (12.2)*** 2.702 (10.4)*** 2.825 (9.78)*** 0.085 (0.85)
Middle 1.978 (3.60)*** 2.668 (8.73)*** 2.717 (8.34)*** 0.147 (1.95)*
High 2.114 (2.48)** 3.068 (3.02)*** 3.248 (3.04)*** 0.173 (2.03)**
Very high 1.616 (1.17) 2.521 (1.47) 2.582 (1.55) 0.191 (1.07)
Target of bribe-giving
(Type of bribe-taker)
Managers of ªrms
collective farms
Reference category
National security agents 0.840 (6.56)*** 1.122 (7.41)*** 1.132 (6.50)***
Police ofªcers 0.767 (5.93)*** 0.713 (4.66)*** 0.627 (4.17)***
High government ofªcials 0.076 (0.25) 0.589 (0.84) 0.535 (0.84)
Party membership 1.149 (1.52) 0.201 (0.22) 0.251 (0.29) 0.092 (0.74)
Family income 0.150 (2.28)** 0.106 (0.92) 0.094 (0.77) 0.017 (2.30)**
Working in the formal
economy
0.045 (0.15) 0.450 (2.67)*** 0.079 (2.32)**
Working in the informal
economy
2.729 (6.85)*** 2.959 (14.5)*** 0.254 (5.80)***
Working only in the formal
economy
Reference category
Working only in the
informal economy
2.331 (11.7)***
Working in both formal and
informal economies
2.599 (28.6)***
Not working 1.312 (2.61)***
Family member’s working
in the formal economy
0.118 (0.12) 0.707 (0.82) 0.764 (0.87) 0.058 (0.82)
Family member’s working
in the informal economy
0.357 (0.97) 0.535 (2.15)*** 0.466 (2.34)*** 0.012 (0.18)
Sample size 138 138 138 139
R2 0.197 0.294 0.297 0.314
Note: Model (1) is estimated without weighting samples from different regions and models (2) through (4) weight samples according to
the share of regional population in total population.
Absolute t-value is reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote signiªcance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level,
respectively.
An interesting result in Table 4 is that party membership has a positive impact on
formal working hours. This might be due to the fact that it is more difªcult for party
members to engage in IEA directly. A positive coefªcient on family income implies
that individuals whose welfare level is relatively high work less in formal jobs.
Table 4 suggests that bribery does indeed reduce formal working hours. Because the
dependent variable is categorized starting from more working hours to fewer, the
positive coefªcient on the experience of bribe-giving means that it reduces working
hours in formal jobs. The magnitude of such an effect does not appear negligible at
all. According to the result in column (2), the experience of bribe-giving increases
the discrepancy between the stipulated working hours and actual working hours by
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Table 4. Bribery and formal working hours
(1) (2)
Dependent variable
Working hours
in formal job
Difference between
stipulated and actual
working hours
Demographic characteristics Gender (male1; female0) 2.687 (1.37)  7.947 (1.62)
Age 0.114 (1.11)  0.926 (3.79)***
Age squared (log) 1.311 (0.63) 14.59 (6.31)***
Number of family members 0.095 (0.15) 0.445 (0.26)
Education Primary school Reference category
Secondary school 1.788 (0.92) 9.202 (0.73)
University/college 1.324 (1.73)*  4.721 (1.45)
Departure year 3.536 (1.28) 4.142 (0.47)
Experience of giving a bribe 4.332 (2.53)** 9.327 (2.28)**
Bribe-giver’s subjective
evaluation of welfare level in
North Korea
Very low Reference category
Low 1.102 (6.75)*** 7.158 (12.02)***
Middle 3.776 (3.64)*** 10.98 (4.41)***
High 4.462 (22.59)*** 13.76 (4.55)***
Very high 2.530 (3.80)*** 14.34 (7.41)***
Target of bribe-giving
(Type of bribe-taker)
Managers of ªrms/
collective farms Reference category
National security agents 0.035 (0.07)  4.481 (0.53)
Police ofªcers 1.593 (3.45)*** 0.128 (0.10)
Community leaders 6.956 (1.94)* 13.40 (3.52)***
High government ofªcials 1.052 (0.54) 1.089 (0.12)
Party membership 2.269 (2.98)** 7.098 (2.53)**
Family income 0.172 (5.15)*** 1.063 (2.39)**
Working in the informal
economy
0.061 (0.05) 0.220 (0.05)
Family member’s working in
the formal economy
3.871 (1.61) 9.434 (1.97)*
Family member’s working in
the informal economy
1.970 (1.57) 8.984 (3.80)***
Sample size 59 57
R2 0.242 0.474
Note: Column (1) is estimated using an ordered logit model. Actual working hours in formal job are divided into ªve categories, that is,
(1) more than 60 hours; (2) 50–59 hours; (3) 40–49 hours; (4) 30–39 hours; (5) less than 30 hours. Column (2) is estimated using ordi-
nary least squares. Columns (1) and (2) weight samples according to the share of regional population in total population.
Absolute t-value is reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote signiªcance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respec-
tively.
9.3 hours. For instance, suppose that an individual works for 45.0 hours per week
without paying bribes. These working hours reduce to 35.7 hours per week if he
gives bribes. This bribe-giving allows him to work in the informal economy instead
of the formal one. The mechanism at work seems to be IEA and so-called “8–3 work-
ers” who pay money to managers of ofªcial ªrms in return for allowing them to be
absent from their ofªcial work.11 In order to work informally, these workers are
more likely to give bribes to ofªcials. This conjecture is supported by the ªnding
that the share of the number of bribe-givers in the total number of 8–3 workers
reaches to 78.3 percent while that in the number of total respondents is 55.5 percent.
4.Conclusions
This paper uses the data of 227 North Korean refugees surveyed in 2009 to examine
whether the informal economy (i.e., the market economy) affects bribery in a
signiªcant way and whether bribery reduces working hours in the formal economy
(i.e., the planned sector). We ªnd that IEA is prevalent in North Korea. A total of
68.4 percent of North Korean refugees used to work in the informal economy
whereas only 50.2 percent used to work in the formal economy. Bribery is also wide-
spread. About half of the respondents replied that they had engaged in bribe-giving
activity, and that the share of expenditure on bribe is 15.3 percent.
We ªnd that the probability of bribe-giving rises by 60.2 percent if one participates
in IEA, and that bribery reduces participation in the formal economy by about nine
hours. This suggests that the North Korean informal economy undermines the sta-
bility of the socialist regime. Our ªndings explain an important reason for the am-
bivalent attitude of the North Korean authorities toward the informal economy. The
government launched a marketization program in July 2002 that abolished retail
price subsidies, permitted ªrms to sell goods at market prices, and permitted ªrms
to use net proªts at their discretion (Kim 2005). But the marketization policy was re-
versed in 2005. Haggard and Noland (2009) report that the regime disproportion-
ately incarcerates those who are involved in market-oriented economic activities.
Finally, there was a recent currency “reform” that conªscated money above a certain
amount in order to reduce IEA.
This zigzag movement of policies toward market activities implies that North Ko-
rean authorities are aware of the conºict between the need to establish markets to
promote growth and efªciency, and the desire to have the central plan remain the
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11 Kim Il-sung, the previous North Korean leader, instructed workers on 3 August 1984 to
produce consumer goods using byproducts and wastes from factories in a self-reliant way.
“8–3 workers” is a term that originated from the date of the announcement.
dominant economic mechanism to ensure the political survival of the socialist re-
gime. Although, ultimately, a socialist dictator always wishes to limit IEA and to re-
store the socialist economy, this task becomes ever more difªcult as IEA gains in
popularity and as bribery erodes the bureaucratic base of the planned economy.
This last point has important implications for the political future of the North Ko-
rean regime.
Appendix
Price index based on prices of rice and corn (North Korean won)
1997 1998 1999 2002 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Price of rice 120 95 64 51.5 1,000 827.22 1,050.71 1,138.86 2,250 2,133.33
Price of corn 80 25 33 27 500 340 374.17 431 1,025 1,075
Price index 0.0610 0.0367 0.0296 0.0240 0.4579 0.3565 0.4354 0.4796 1.0000 0.9793
Source: For prices of rice and corn between 2004 and 2009, information was gathered from 41 articles of The Daily NK. Information
on the years 1997 and 1998 was acquired from the responses in the survey, and for information on the years 1999 and 2002 we relied on
reports from Hyundai Research Institute (2001) and Dong and Lee (2005), respectively. The weight was calculated based on the average
amount of rice (260 kg) and corn (266 kg) consumed by the refugees in the survey in 2008.
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